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PREFACE
The following report was first published in April 2009 through the Land
Use Clinic at The University of Montana School of Law. The authors wish
to thank Bill Schenk, T.O. Smith, and others at the Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks for not only recognizing the emerging importance of
wildlife issues in local land use, but also for providing the funding that
made the report possible. As testament to their foresight, Montana's first
court decision addressing wildlife evidence in subdivision review was is-
sued recently in Richards v. County of Missoula (DV-07-1635). The report
now contains an Addendum that summarizes the key holdings in Richards,
which is on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court.
The authors also wish to thank the Public Land & Resources Law Re-
view for disseminating the report to a broader audience. Although the re-
port focuses on local governance of private land development, the connec-
tion to public lands is profound. In nearly every case where local govern-
ments stepped in to mitigate wildlife impacts caused by private develop-
ment, those governments (and reviewing courts on appeal) were influenced
by the presence and significance of nearby public lands and resources.
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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that local land use decisions can affect fish and wildlife re-
sources, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks commissioned
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this report on the role of fish and wildlife evidence in local land use regula-
tion. The Department presented the Land Use Clinic with a series of ques-
tions designed to understand how Montana courts, as well as other courts
nationwide, review local government land use decisions that implicate fish
and wildlife issues.
This report addresses four topics: (1) the role of fish and wildlife evi-
dence in enacting land use regulations; (2) the role of fish and wildlife evi-
dence in decisions on specific development proposals; (3) the level of
specificity required when using fish and wildlife evidence; and (4) resolv-
ing conflicting fish and wildlife evidence.
For each topic, the report provides a short answer, summarizes the gen-
eral rules that apply to local governments, describes any Montana fish and
wildlife cases on point, compares Montana law to other jurisdictions, and
then concludes with suggested best practices for local government.
RESEARCH APPROACH
In preparing this report, the Clinic surveyed court cases across the coun-
try. Whenever possible, the Clinic relied on land use cases that directly
implicated fish and wildlife issues. When such cases could not be found,
the Clinic relied on other land use and local government cases, and ana-
lyzed how those decisions might be applied to cases involving fish and
wildlife.
Because local governments derive their land use authority from state
statutes, the outcomes of the cases from other states often hinged on statutes
and local ordinances that are different than those in Montana. In such
cases, the report notes the regulatory differences involved.
Citations to authority appear as footnotes throughout the report. Also
appended to the report are a list of related articles of interest (App. B) and a
summary of selected land use statutes from other states that relate to fish
and wildlife (App. A).
BACKGROUND LAW
This report builds from the premise that a local government in Montana
has the authority to consider fish and wildlife issues when it regulates land
use. This premise is based on Montana's growth policy, zoning, and subdi-
vision statutes, which are enabling statutes that give local governments land
use planning authority. These statutes draw explicit connections between
land use and natural resources. These statutes also generally enable a local
government to exercise its "police powers" - powers to protect the health,
safety, and general welfare of the community. Montana and other states
nationwide have recognized that the regulation of natural resources is im-
plicit within the general police powers of a local government, even when
2009]
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natural resources are not explicitly mentioned in a state's enabling legisla-
tion.4
Montana law enables local governments to comprehensively plan for
land use in their communities through a non-regulatory "growth policy." If
a local government opts to have a growth policy, the statutes require,
among other things, that the local government inventory and set planning
goals for the "natural resources" within the community.5 A growth policy
may also address how projected development will impact "threatened or
endangered wildlife and critical wildlife habitat and corridors," and de-
scribe measures to mitigate those impacts. 6 Zoning and subdivision regula-
tions then implement the planning goals in the growth policy. These regu-
lations must "substantially comply" with the growth policy.
7
Zoning regulations, which are optional in Montana, allow a local gov-
ernment to determine what land uses and densities are appropriate in vari-
ous areas of the community. Although Montana's zoning statutes do not
expressly mention wildlife, a local government has the implicit authority to
zone based on wildlife concerns.8 Additionally, to substantially comply
with the "natural resources" element in its growth policy, a local govern-
ment must consider what natural resource characteristics exist in the com-
munity and what the "most appropriate use of land" may be when natural
resources are involved.9
Subdivision regulations, which are mandatory in Montana, require a local
government to consider impacts caused by the division of land. Among the
impacts a local government must consider are impacts on "the natural envi-
ronment" and impacts on "wildlife and wildlife habitat. ' 'i ° Many subdivi-
sion applications must include an environmental assessment that details
these impacts." The local government may then require the reasonable
4. In Montana, Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Bd. of Co. Commrs., considered effects to wild-
life and wildlife habitat in evaluating how a rezoning affected the public's welfare. 2001 MT 99, 1 31,
305 Mont. 232, 25 P.3d 168. Prominent nationwide examples include Moviematic Industries Corp. v.
Bd. of Co. Commrs., 349 So.2d 667, 669-70 (Fla. 3d Dist. App.); Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Moorman, 664 So.2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995); Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Commn., 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J.
1991). The Moorman case is noteworthy because the Florida Constitution has a section on environ-
mental protection that states, "[lit shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural
resources and scenic beauty." Moorman, 664 So.2d at 933. The court goes on to say that there is an
obvious public interest in this policy, as environmental degradation impacts the economy, health, safety,
and welfare of the people. Id. Given Montana's similar Constitutional provisions on the clean and
healthful environment, it would seem that the exercise of police power in regulating land uses to protect
wildlife and their habitats would be a legitimate use of a local government's power. Mont. Const. art.
IX, sect. I and art. II, sect. 3.
5. Mont. Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (2007).
6. § 76-1-60(4).
7. §§ 76-1-605 and -606; North 93 Neighbors, Inc. v. Bd. of Co. Commrs., 2006 MT 12, In 22-23,
332 Mont. 327, 137 P.3d 557.
8. Supra n. 1.
9. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 76-2-201 to -203 (counties); §§ 76-2-301 to -303 (municipalities).
10. § 76-3-608(3).
II. § 76-3-603.
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mitigation of impacts identified during subdivision review, or may deny a
subdivision proposal if the unmitigable impacts are too great.1
2
Thus, the Montana growth policy, zoning, and subdivision statutes give
broad police powers that implicitly allow for the regulation of natural re-
sources, and also contain explicit provisions that include natural resources
as a factor to be considered in land use regulation and decision making at
the local level. This report focuses on how a local government exercises
that implicit and explicit authority when fish and wildlife issues are in-
volved.
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
I. THE ROLE OF FISH & WILDLIFE EVIDENCE IN
ENACTING LAND USE REGULATIONS
Question Presented
What level of scientific evidence is required when a local government
enacts a land use ordinance that protects fish and wildlife resources?
Short Answer
When enacting a land use ordinance that protects fish or wildlife re-
sources, a court will likely defer to the judgment of the local government
and presume that the ordinance is valid. So long as there is a "reasonable"
factual basis for the ordinance, the ordinance will be upheld. While no
Montana cases define what level of scientific evidence is "reasonable,"
cases from other states suggest that basic types of scientific evidence will
be sufficient, and that local government need not initiate complex, property-
specific studies at the enactment stage.
General Rules
In Montana, a local government ordinance is presumed valid and reason-
able if it substantially relates to public health, safety, or welfare.13 A court
reviewing the local government action will not substitute its discretion for
that of the local government and will review the record only for an abuse of
discretion.14 An abuse of discretion occurs when the action is "so lacking
in fact and foundation" that "it is clearly unreasonable and constitutes an
abuse of discretion."' 15 Thus, a local government does not abuse its discre-
12. § 76-3-608(4).
13. Schanz v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 328, 335, 597 P.2d 67, 71 (1979); Boland v. City of Great
Falls, 275 Mont. 128, 910 P.2d 890 (1996). This rule is consistent with nationwide practices. See
Rathkopf et aL., I The Law of Zoning and Planning § 3:13 (4th ed., West 2008).
14. Schanz, 182 Mont. at 335, 597 P.2d at 71.
15. Id.
2009]
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tion if the record contains reasonable evidence to support the land use ordi-
nance.
Under this deferential standard of review, the party challenging the ordi-
nance has the burden of showing that the ordinance is unreasonable., 6 In
other contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that local governments
may rely on credible studies from other jurisdictions' so long as the studies
"fairly support the ... rationale for the ordinance."' 7 Scholars also observe
that even when the proof is "fairly debatable," local government will likely
prevail.18 Notably, however, the government's rationale must be in the
record before it takes an action; local governments generally cannot "cure"
a defective record by adding further rationale after the fact.' 9
The case of Lowe v. City of Missoula20 illustrates how the abuse of dis-
cretion standard is applied in a Montana land use matter. In Lowe, the City
of Missoula rezoned a parcel of land - an act that required amendment of
the zoning ordinance and triggered Montana's 12 statutory zoning criteria.2'
The City failed to make factual findings concerning each of the 12 criteria.
Further, where the record did contain evidence, that evidence suggested the
relevant criteria were not met. Thus, an absence of factual findings, cou-
pled with evidence disfavoring the zoning amendment, led the Montana
Supreme Court to conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred.22
Although deferential review favors local government, the Lowe decision
suggests that the local government nonetheless should place into the record
all evidence that it has to support the land use ordinance. Whatever evi-
dence is used should then be joined with findings of fact that are consistent
with the evidence and that show the relationship to public health, safety,
and welfare. Where evidence conflicts, the local government should ex-
plain why it chose to follow certain evidence and disregard other evidence
(see Part III below). These protective measures reduce the risk that a court
will impose its judgment on matters more appropriately within the sphere of
23local government.
While a "reasonable" public record enables a local government to pass
deferential review, the local government must also be mindful of Montana's
rigorous constitutional protections of the public's right to know about and
16. 1 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 3:15.
17. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425,438 (2002).
18. Id.
19. Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Co., 319 Mont. 169, 178-79, 83 P.3d 266, 272-73 (2004).
20. 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551 (1974), overruled on other grounds in Greens at Fort Missoula,
LLC v. City of Missoula, 271 Mont. 398, 897 P.2d 1078 (1995) (holding that zoning and rezoning are
both "legislative" acts).
21. The criteria now appear at Mont. Code Ann. § 76-2-304.
22. 165 Mont. at 43, 525 P.2d at 553.
23. North 93 Neighbors, Inc., 2006 MT 132, 35, 332 Mont 327, 137 P.3d 557 ("[The Board
must equip reviewing courts with a record of the facts it relied upon in making its decision to avoid
judicial intrusion into matters committed to the Board's discretion.").
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participate in government actions. 24 In North 93 Neighbors, Inc. v. Board
of County Commissioners, Flathead County received over 4,400 public
comments concerning an amendment to the county zoning ordinance.
Many of those comments were made during the public hearing on the
amendment, and many opposed the amendment. Despite these significant
public comments, the County approved the amendment based on a staff
report that predated the public hearing and did not address the public com-
ments received. 25
The Montana Supreme Court held that the Board was unreasonable and
abused its discretion by failing to consider the public comments and "incor-
porate them into its decision-making process. 26 Absent sufficient factual
findings about the comments, the court "cannot know whether the public
raised novel issues ... and whether the Board appropriately responded to
those issues.27
If there had been no public comment in North 93 Neighbors, the court
concluded that the local government's reliance on a staff report would have
"generally complied" with the reasonableness requirements.28 The report
contained basic factual findings addressing the applicable criteria, and those
findings supported a rezone.2 9 Thus, the public participation increased the
local government's fact finding responsibility by requiring additional find-
ings that explained how the public comments did or did not affect the gov-
erning body's decision.
Montana Fish & Wildlife Cases
No Montana land use cases specify the type of scientific evidence that
would be considered "reasonable" for purposes of enacting a land use ordi-
nance protecting fish and wildlife. Montana case law has considered the
related question of whether a local government is required to consider fish
and wildlife evidence when enacting a land use regulation. In Montana
Wildlife Federation v. Sager,30 environmental groups challenged the crea-
tion of two zoning districts because the effects on wildlife had not been
considered. The Montana Supreme Court held that state zoning laws do not
expressly require consideration of wildlife and that "when dealing with the
police power" it is up to the government "to decide what regulations are
needed."'', The holding thus suggests that a local government can zone
without considering effects on wildlife, although other decisions such as
24. Mont. Const. art. 11, § 9.
25. North 93 Neighbors, Inc., 26.
26. Id. at 35.
27. Id.
28. ld. at 31.
29. Id.
30. 190 Mont. 247, 620 P.2d 1189 (1980).
31. Id. at 261, 620 P.2d at 1197-98.
2009]
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Greater Yellowstone Coalition (discussed in Section I) leave a different
impression. 32 The court also observed that state subdivision laws would
require the local government to review effects on wildlife and wildlife habi-
tat if landowners later proceeded to subdivide property within the zoning
districts.
33
Fish & Wildlife Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions have more specifically explored the level of evidence
necessary to support a wildlife-related land use ordinance. Not surpris-
ingly, Florida and Washington have the most case law due to state planning
laws that require local governments to protect critical wildlife habitat in
their land use regulations. In both states, the state wildlife agencies assist
local governments by providing the basic wildlife evidence needed to sup-
port the land use regulations.34
In Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman,35 a landowner chal-
lenged an ordinance in Big Pine Key, Florida. The ordinance protected the
endangered Florida Key Deer by restricting fencing so that the deer could
roam freely in search of food and water. The Florida Supreme Court stated
that government "is given wide range in exercising its lawful powers to
regulate land use for environmental reasons, and any such land-use regula-
tions are valid if supported by a rational basis consistent with overall poli-
cies of the State." The Big Pine Key ordinance was rational because the
record contained "competent substantial evidence that the unregulated erec-
tion of fencing in the affected area is contrary to Florida's overall policy of
environmental stewardship. 36 That evidence included proof that the deer is
"largely concentrated" in Big Pine Key, that human development and roads
endanger the deer, that there are only 350 - 400 deer left, and that 100 -
250 deer are needed to sustain a viable species.37
Glisson v. Alachua County38 involved 3,100 acres of private land in Flor-
ida that were adjacent to a state wildlife management area. Alachua County
placed development restrictions on the land to protect wetlands, areas of
"exceptional upland habitat," and "hammock" zones that would be a transi-
tion area between the upland habitat and outside development. The County
intended these restrictions to make the area's uses more compatible with
uses on nearby state lands. The case suggests that the County relied on
32. Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Bd. of Co. Commrs., 2001 MT 99, 305 Mont. 232, 25
P.3d 168, discussed in Section II, treats wildlife effects as relevant to zoning.
33. Sager, 190 Mont. at 261, 620 P.2d at 1198. This observation assumes that future subdivisions
would not be divisions of land exempt from subdivision review. If the divisions were exempt, the local
government likely would not have occasion to review effects on wildlife or wildlife habitat.
34. These statutes are summarized in App. A.
35. 664 So.2d 930 (Fla. 1995).
36. Id. at 933.
37. Id. at 931.
38. 558 So.2d 1030 (F. Ct. App. 1990).
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general evidence about the types of habitat in the area and how those habi-
tat types benefit wildlife. The County also had evidence that 6 of the
county's 45 active eagle nests were in the restricted area.
39
The affected landowners challenged Alachua County's restrictions be-
cause the protected area was not unique and had already experienced mod-
erate levels of human development. Further, other areas in the county had
higher ecological values and higher numbers of eagle nests. 40 Applying
deferential review, the Florida District Court held that, regardless of the
landowners' evidence, the County had a reasonable evidentiary basis for its
regulation and had validly exercised its police powers. 41
In Ferry County v. Concerned Friends of Ferry County,42 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court applied a state statute that specifically requires local
government to address wildlife protection when creating a comprehensive
plan. 43 Under the statute, local government must use "best available sci-
ence" when planning for species protection. Although best available science
is arguably a more rigorous standard than deferential review, the Ferry
County decision is worth reviewing for its detailed discussion of wildlife
evidence.
In 2000, Ferry County enacted a comprehensive plan that listed only two
species, the bald eagle and the lynx, as being endangered, threatened, or
sensitive. The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife submitted con-
trary evidence suggesting that there were actually 12 species that should
have been listed. The Department's evidence was based on Department
data, categorized by region, that identified priority fish and wildlife species
based on GIS mapping technology. 44 Washington law expressly allows
local governments to use the Department's data when implementing local
wildlife protection.45
Ferry County officials disregarded the Department's evidence because
the regional data did not conclusively establish that the missing species
were present in the county. The County consulted with a retired wildlife
planner from Alaska, who relied on field guides, wildlife texts, and inter-
views with a county biologist to form his opinion that listing the other spe-
cies was not necessary. The County's consultant submitted short summary
letters to support his opinion, but the letters did not indicate what process
the consultant used to reach his opinion. The consultant also failed to do
39. Id. at 1032-33.
40. Id. at 1033.
41. Id. at 1038.
42. 123 P.3d 102, 107 (Wash. 2005).
43. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.172 (1995); Wash. Admin. Code 365-195-900 (2008). These
statutes are summarized in App. A.
44. Ferry Co., 123 P.3d at 104 n. 1.
45. Id.
20091
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any on-site field observations and failed to coordinate with federal, local,
and tribal scientists with expertise in Ferry County.46
The court concluded that Ferry County failed to use best available sci-
ence. One important factor for determining best available science is
"whether the analysis of the local decision-maker of the scientific evidence
involved a reasoned process ... . While the County's expert was
qualified to provide an opinion, he did not employ a scientific methodology
in reaching the opinion, and the court deemed his opinion to be "unscien-
tific" and "speculation or surmise.
' 48
While recognizing that a local government may not have the resources to
conduct large studies, the court nonetheless concluded that a local govern-
ment still has a responsibility to show "that it is complying with the law in
considering best available science." 49 The court stated that the County
"need not develop the scientific information through its own means, but it
must rely on scientific information.,,50  The County was entitled to "dis-
agree with or ignore scientific recommendations and resources" from the
state and tribes, but by doing so it "necessarily had to unilaterally develop
and obtain valid scientific information.",51 Further, the court did not require
the county to affirmatively prove the absence of species within its jurisdic-
tion, only that it "provide a reasoned analysis of the range of alternatives
presented by scientific evidence in the record. 52 Subsequent to this deci-
sion, Washington codified criteria to assist local governments in determin-
ing what qualifies as best available science.53
Conclusion
While each land use case presents its own unique facts, the above cases
collectively suggest some best practices for local governments enacting
land use ordinances that protect fish and wildlife:
(1) Use Basic Scientific Evidence. Foremost, a local government needs
to have a basic level of scientific evidence in the record - perhaps a combi-
nation of broad regional data, national or regional studies relevant to the
types of wildlife and habitat in the regulated area, and testimony from a
local or state biologist who has observed wildlife in the regulated area.
This combination allows a local government to rely on studies and data it
46. Id. at 105.
47. Id. at 107.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 105.
50. Id. at 108.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 107.
53. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 365-195-900 through 365-195-925. Noteworthy is the requirement
that local governments use a "precautionary or a no risk approach,' in which development and land use
activities are strictly limited until the uncertainty is sufficiently resolved" through further study. § 365-
195-920.
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has not commissioned, but still envisions that the local government will
show some general connections between the outside studies and the regu-
lated area. What does not appear to be required is a government-
commissioned study that definitively details the presence of wildlife on
each property within the regulated area.
(2) State the Relationship to the Police Powers. Whatever evidence a
local government uses should be directly connected to the health, safety,
and welfare of the community through findings of fact. The local govern-
ment should make explicit findings of fact showing that connection and
should not assume that it can "cure" the record later by relying on new evi-
dence or findings.
(3) Avoid Speculation and Address Conflicting Evidence. The local
governments most vulnerable to challenge are those that assume or merely
speculate about the effects the land use ordinance will have. As the cases
show, even relying on a qualified expert may not be enough if that expert is
merely speculating. Equally vulnerable are local governments that ignore
scientific evidence without explaining why. In Montana, failing to address
public comment also makes the local government appear unreasonable and
makes a decision less likely to survive deferential review.
II. THE ROLE OF FISH & WILDLIFE EVIDENCE IN DECISIONS ON
DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS
Question Presented
What level of scientific evidence is required when a local government
makes a decision on a specific development proposal that affects fish and
wildlife resources?
Short Answer
A substantial evidence standard applies to a local government's land use
decision. This standard requires a reasonable and adequate amount of evi-
dence to support a decision, amounting to more than mere conjecture or a
scintilla of evidence. If a decision meets the substantial evidence standard,
the court will treat the decision with deference, not substituting its own
judgment for that of the government.
General Rules
After the local government enacts a land use ordinance, it will apply that
ordinance to specific land use proposals. When deciding a land use pro-
posal, the local government typically receives an application and considers
evidence regarding whether the proposal meets the terms of the ordinance.
That evidence can come from a variety of sources, including the applicant,
the local planning staff, opposing parties, and other interested government
agencies. The local government then weighs the evidence, makes findings
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of fact about the evidence, and explains how the evidence supports its deci-
sion on the proposal.
A local government decision will be upheld unless the decision is "arbi-
trary and capricious. 54 Reversal will not occur "merely because the record
contains inconsistent evidence or evidence which might support a different
result." 55 Rather, arbitrary and capricious decisions are those that "appear
to be random, unreasonable or seemingly unmotivated, based on the exist-
ing record. 56  The Montana Supreme Court has observed that a standard
requiring a local government to "not act unreasonably" is a "broad and sub-
jective standard [that] implicitly vests a substantial level of discretion in the
governing body."
57
Kiely Construction, LLC v. City of Red Lodge58 demonstrates how a local
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying a subdivision pro-
posal. In that case, the City of Red Lodge disregarded applicable subdivi-
sion law and ultimately denied the developer's proposal without issuing any
written statement or findings explaining the basis of the denial. 59 Because
the City of Red Lodge acted contrary to the law and did not support its de-
cision with a record, the decision was deemed arbitrary and capricious. 60
The principal way a local government acts arbitrarily and capriciously is
by committing "clear error,"'6 which can occur if the government's actions
are not supported by substantial evidence. 62  Thus, the "substantial evi-
dence" standard is the touchstone that guides local government as it decides
land use proposals. Substantial evidence is defined as "that evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it con-
sists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
54. Madison River R.V. Ltd. v. Town of Ennis, 2000 MT 15, 30, 298 Mont. 91, 994 P.2d 1098
(holding that the standard applicable to agencies applies to local government as well). The standard is
codified for subdivision decisions. Mont. Code Ann. § 76-3-625. Although the wording of Madison
River R.V. leaves the impression that arbitrary and capricious review may differ from the substantial
evidence standard, a review of the briefing below indicates that the two concepts are interrelated, as
summarized in this Section. This interrelationship is reflected in the other Montana cases cited, as well
as in national treatises. See e.g., 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 62:34 ("A determination which is
not supported by substantial evidence is an arbitrary decision.").
55. Silva v. City of Columbia Falls, 258 Mont. 329, 335, 852 P.2d 671, 675 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Kiely Const., LLC v. City of Red Lodge, 2002 MT 241, 133, 312 Mont. 52, 66, 57 P.3d 836,
845.
58. 2002 MT 241,312 Mont. 52, 57 P.3d 836.
59. Id. atJ 12.
60. Id. at 68, 70.
61. Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 121,347 Mont. 197, 197
P.3d 482.
62. Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 2005 MT 146, T 58, 327 Mont. 306, 114 P.3d 1009. The court
lists three ways that clear error can occur, of which substantial evidence is the first: (1) after review of
the record, the findings must be supported by substantial evidence, (2) if there is substantial evidence to
support the findings, the Court will determine whether the agency misapprehended the effect of the
evidence, and (3) even assuming the first two requirements are met, the Court may conclude that a
finding is clearly erroneous when, in spite of evidence supporting it, a review of the record leaves the
Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
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than a preponderance. Although it may be based on weak and conflicting
evidence, in order to rise to the level of substantial evidence it must be
greater than trifling or frivolous."
63
The case of Christianson v. Gasvoda64 illustrates the substantial evidence
standard in the subdivision context. There, Cascade County denied a de-
veloper's subdivision application. The developer had previously subdi-
vided adjacent lands, and the lot owners in that subdivision suffered drain-
ing and flooding issues. The developer submitted an engineering plan for
dealing with drainage issues in the new subdivision, and an expert testified
on the developer's behalf. Several residents of the existing subdivision
objected to the new development and argued it would exacerbate drainage
issues in the area. The County also "investigated further" of its own accord
and noted the history of flooding in the area involved. In reviewing all the
evidence, the County concluded that the developer's expert and the engi-
neering plan were not credible. The subdivision denial was upheld on ap-
peal because the record contained "substantial evidence that the proposed
subdivision would adversely affect public health, safety, and welfare."
65
Thus, the layperson testimony of neighbors and an informal County inves-
tigation constituted substantial evidence, even in the face of the developer's
formal engineering plans and expert testimony.
In contrast, the recent Montana district court case of Simmons v. Helena
City Commission66 highlights how a governing body acts arbitrarily and
capriciously by approving a subdivision based on insufficient evidence.
Montana subdivision law required the developer in Simmons to submit an
environmental assessment that, among other things, described the probable
impacts the proposed subdivision would have on water quality. The 325-lot
subdivision would have been situated over a shallow groundwater area "ad-
jacent to Prickly Pear Creek, which flows through the Helena Valley into
Lake Helena and then into the Missouri River." The developer's environ-
mental assessment did not include available reports and groundwater test
data relevant to the affected area. Additionally, the assessment did not ad-
dress the interconnection between the "shallow aquifer and nearby Prickly
Pear Creek." Instead, the assessment concluded that the subdivision's sew-
age plans made it unnecessary to do a risk analysis concerning potential
sewage leaks into the aquifer.
67
The district court concluded that the environmental assessment lacked
the information necessary for the City to review effects to water quality.
The court stated:
63. Barrett v. Asarco Inc., 245 Mont. 196, 200, 799 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1990).
64. 242 Mont. 212, 789 P.2d 1234 (1990).
65. Id. at 213-15, 789 P.2d at 1235-36.
66. (Cause No. BDV-2005-883), Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (March 23,
2009).
67. Id. at 2, 5.
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An agency must take a hard look at the environmental im-
pacts of a given project or proposal. Implicit in the re-
quirement ... is the obligation to make an adequate compi-
lation of relevant information, to analyze it reasonably, and
to consider all pertinent data. . . . [W]hile a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action, including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made. In other
words, the Court looks closely at whether the agency has
taken a hard look at the question presented.
Further, courts have held that general statements about pos-
sible effects and the existence of some risk do not equal the
hard look that is provided by the provision of more defini-
tive information. Courts have also held that if an agency re-
lies only on expert opinion without supplying the underly-
ing data supporting that opinion, such an activity vitiates
the public's ability to challenge government action. In
other words, the public is entitled to receive the underlying
environmental data from which an expert may derive his
opinion.
68
Although experts for the developer and the City opined that there was no
risk of sewage leaks, the court held that the environmental assessment
"should have discussed the issue of a leaking sewer pipe in shallow
groundwater that is potentially connected to Prickly Pear Creek. That is an
impact with which the Commission should have been made familiar." The
court then voided the subdivision approval.69 While this decision focused
on water quality, it is relevant to fish and wildlife because environmental
assessments for subdivision must also address effects to wildlife and wild-
life habitat.7°
Montana Fish & Wildlife Cases
Montana's subdivision statutes require that a local government review a
subdivision proposal for its effects on "wildlife and wildlife habitat." 7'
Montana case law contains two recent decisions considering this criterion.
Notably, in both decisions the local government made a sufficient record to
survive arbitrary and capricious review. The record in these cases can be
68. Id. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 7, 12.
70. Mont. Code Ann. § 76-3-603.
71. § 76-3-608(3)(a).
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contrasted with the arbitrary and capricious conduct that the City of Red
Lodge demonstrated in Kiely Construction, discussed above.
In the first case, Vergin v. Flathead County72 (an unpublished decision)'
Flathead County cited impacts to wildlife as one factor in denying a devel-
opment proposal in the Smith Valley of Flathead County. The County also
concluded that the proposed density was higher than the surrounding areas
and the air quality and agricultural lands would be negatively affected.
Regarding wildlife, the County made a factual finding that the development
was "anticipated to result in incremental effects on area wildlife due to pets,
increased human activity, automobile traffic, noise, and outdoor lighting. 73
While the Vergin opinion does not detail the underlying evidence, the par-
ties' briefs reference evidence that the proposed development was adjacent
to the Batavia Waterfowl Production Area, a large wetland area and wildlife
refuge. The area provided habitat for birds and deer, as well as mountain
lions preying on deer. In addition to the effects on wildlife, the County had
concerns about the dangers of increased mountain lion and human interac-
tion.74 The developer complained that the findings lacked sufficient detail
and cited Washington case law requiring evidence of "specific, proven,
significant" effects before denying a proposal based on environmental im-
pacts. The Montana Supreme Court rejected the Washington standard and
concluded that the County's factual findings were adequate under arbitrary
and capricious review.75
A year later, in Madison R. V., Ltd. v. Town of Ennis,76 an RV park subdi-
vision was denied, again in part based on wildlife impacts. Other concerns
related to the safety of children using the park and the aesthetic effects on
the Town of Ennis. The principal concern, however, was that sewer and
waste disposal at the proposed park (73 RV spots on less than 10 acres)
would affect the water quality of the Madison River, and in turn, harm the
fishery. The record in this case is more fully discussed:
The Town's engineer described his waste water flow moni-
toring in the Town's sewer system. He collected data show-
ing total water flows greater than the capacity of the sewer
system, leading him to conclude that the Town's sewage
treatment lagoon was already hydraulically overloaded. He
informed the Town Council that the type of discharge per-
mit possessed by the Town was under review by the De-
partment of Health and Environmental Sciences and the
Department of Environmental Quality. He stated that a
strong possibility existed that additional restrictions would
72. 996 P.2d 882 (Table), 1999 WL 77679 (Mont. 1999).
73. Id. at9R 1-13.
74. Respt.'s Br. 26-27 (Aug. 13, 1998).
75. Vergin, 9N 16-20.
76. 2000 MT 15, 298 Mont. 91,994 P.2d 1098.
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soon be placed on the amount of nutrients that could be
discharged into state waters such as the Madison River un-
der such permits.
The Town's engineer further stated that holding tanks for
recreational vehicles are more biologically loaded than
residential sewer discharge. The engineer for R.V. admitted
that the waste water from recreational vehicles is stronger
than household waste and that care must be taken to avoid
"shock loading" of sewage treatment systems by such
waste. An environmental engineer specialist submitted a
letter discussing the potential effect of septage (waste that
has no dissolved oxygen in the waste water) from recrea-
tional vehicle tanks on the Town's waste water lagoon. The
environmental engineer specialist stated that one load of
septage from a recreational vehicle is equivalent to the or-
ganic load from about 456 people in a very short time. En-
nis's lagoon was not designed for this type of shock load.
Septage can contribute to organic overload, odors, and
permit violations. ....
In his letter, [Patrick Byorth, fisheries biologist for the
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks] stated that
his Department had received information indicating that
sewage from the proposed recreational vehicle park may
overwhelm the Town of Ennis's sewage treatment system
and enter the Madison River. He stated that formaldehyde
from recreational vehicle holding tanks could further exac-
erbate such problems, degrade water quality, and harm the
fishery.77
The developer in Madison R.V. argued "there was no definitive profes-
sional testimony" that its proposed development would overload the
Town's sewage system. 78 The Montana Supreme Court rejected the need
for "definitive" evidence. Observing that there was "considerable testi-
mony raising serious questions about the effect of adding a recreational
vehicle park's waste to the Town's sewage treatment system," the court
concluded the denial was not arbitrary or capricious. 79 Thus, the Town of
Ennis did not need definitive professional testimony to deny the subdivision
based on environmental and wildlife concerns.
While Montana's zoning statutes do not expressly mention wildlife as a
review criterion, the statutes do expressly mention "public health and gen-
77. Id. at 7U 33, 34, 37.
78. Jd.at 32.
79. Id. at I 32, 39.
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eral welfare," "overcrowding of land," "undue concentration of popula-
tion," and "the most appropriate use of land" as criteria to be considered in
zoning decisions. 80 In keeping with national trends, Montana's case law
treats these broad categories as including effects on wildlife.8'
Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners82
is the principal Montana case concerning zoning and wildlife. There,
Gallatin County considered the rezoning of 323 acres of undeveloped land
near Duck Creek, Hebgen Lake, and Forest Service lands. The rezoning
changed the allowable density from 32 single family residences to as many
as 1,615 multiple family residences.83 The Greater Yellowstone Coalition
decision describes the surrounding habitat as follows:
The area around the Duck Creek parcel contains important
wildlife habitat. The northern portion of the parcel along
Fir Ridge serves as a corridor for grizzly bears traveling be-
tween Yellowstone National Park and the Madison Range.
Evidence in the record estimates that 16 grizzly bears use
the Duck Creek parcel as part of their habitat and another
17 grizzly bears have been found in adjacent habitat. These
bears represent approximately 10% of the entire grizzly
population in the Greater Yellowstone area. Elk, moose,
and bison from Yellowstone National Park use the area in
and around Duck Creek for winter range. Duck Creek itself
is important trout habitat. Testimony indicated that in-
creased density in development on the Duck Creek parcel
will displace wildlife, affect habitat, lead to an increase in
human-wildlife conflict, and degrade the water quality in
Duck Creek.84
Despite this evidence, Gallatin County approved the rezone based on a
general finding that the new zoning "met the general welfare, public neces-
sity and convenience" of the area.85 The district court, however, voided the
rezone after concluding that there was "nothing in the record" and "scant
evidence in the record" to support such a finding.86 The district court held
that the evidence showed just the opposite - that the "extremely sensitive
nature of the Duck Creek parcel and its importance to wildlife habitat.., is
a significant factor to be weighed in evaluating the public welfare ."87
80. Mont. Code Ann. § 76-2-203 (counties); § 76-2-303 (municipalities).
81. Supran. 1.
82. 2001 MT 99, 305 Mont. 232, 25 P.3d 168.
83. Id. at 9H 4-5.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 30.
86. Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Bd. of Co. Commrs. (Cause No. DV-96-33 1), Findings
of Fact No. 98-100, Conclusions of Law No. 21 (Apr. 19, 2000).
87. Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 2001 MT 99, 31, 305 Mont. 232, 25 P.3d 168.
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Affirming the district court, the Montana Supreme Court cited to substantial
evidence in the record from neighbors, agency officials, a wildlife biologist,
and the general public that showed the rezone would negatively affect
"some of the most significant wildlife habitat in the country," harming both
the general public and people living in the area. 88 Because wildlife evi-
dence played such a significant role in this zoning case, questions exist
about whether Sager (discussed in Section I), which treated wildlife evi-
dence as unnecessary in zoning, may be limited in its effect.
Fish & Wildlife Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Other states also apply the substantial evidence standard to land use deci-
sions. In Minnesota, for example, the reviewing court in Application of
Central Baptist Theological Seminary,89 upheld a state agency's denial of a
radio tower based on substantial evidence of harmful effects to wildlife.
While the case involves a state agency, rather than a local government, its
description of wildlife evidence is instructive.
Central Baptist Theological Seminary operated a non-profit radio station
and sought to build a tower in the center of Jones Lake, a wetland in New
Brighton. The tower would be mounted on a 48-foot base and would in-
volve three sets of guy wires, six anchors, and a 700-foot power line 15 feet
above the lake, running to the transmission building. The administrative
record reflected that Jones Lake provided good waterfowl habitat and nest-
ing cover, and it was home to many significant bird species. The lake also
provided habitat for muskrats, pheasants, and rabbits. There were surveys
quantifying the types and amount of wildlife occurring on Jones Lake on
particular observation dates. Further, the record showed that Jones Lake
comprised 30% of the total wetland acreage in the county. The Department
of Natural Resources denied the tower permit based on the record and the
results of a wildlife impact review.90 The Minnesota Court of Appeals af-
firmed, finding substantial evidence that the tower would be detrimental to
significant wildlife habitat. In particular, the court cited evidence that qual-
ity waterfowl habitat is scarce in the area, that waterfowl would avoid the
lake because of the tower, that there was little alternative habitat for dis-
placed waterfowl, and that bird mortality occurs when birds collide with
guy wires in taking off, landing, and courtship behavior.9'
Vermont also applies the substantial evidence standard. Under Vermont
law, a permit for a subdivision or development "will not be granted if it is
demonstrated by any party opposing the applicant that a development or
88. Id. at 9 31-34.
89. 370 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. App. 1985).
90. Minnesota law required the wildlife impact review for this permit. Minn. R. § 6115.0210 and
Minnesota Environmental Protection Act, Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. The full text of the statutes
appears in App. A.
91. Application of C. Baptist Theological Seminary, 370 N.W.2d at 645, 648.
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subdivision will destroy or significantly imperil necessary wildlife habitat
or any endangered species. 92 In the case In re Southview Associates,93 the
developer proposed a vacation home development on 88 acres of land that
was situated in a deeryard. Although the area had once contained 600 acres
of deeryard, the 280-320 remaining acres comprised the only deeryard in a
10.7 square mile area, and it supported 20 deer over the winter. Expert
testimony in the record reflected conflicting opinions about the severity of
the development's effect on the deeryard. Some experts concluded that the
proposed development would have impaired the mature softwood cover that
provides critical deer wintering habitat, and that the development also
would have stressed the deer by creating winter time noise and activity
from people, vehicles, and pets. The developer submitted a Wildlife Man-
agement Plan to mitigate the loss of the mature softwood area by increasing
deer food and encouraging growth of immature softwood.94
The Vermont Environmental Board, a state board that reviews certain
types of land use proposals that affect the environment, denied the vacation
home development. Despite conflicting expert testimony of the issue, the
Board concluded that the Wildlife Management Plan would not adequately
mitigate the adverse effects. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that
substantial evidence supported the Board's decision: "[W]e must defer to
the Board when its findings are supported-even if the record contains con-
tradictory evidence-and when its conclusions are rationally derived from its
findings and based on a correct interpretation of the law." 95 The court also
rejected the argument that the Board could deny a proposal only upon proof
that wildlife deaths will occur.
9 6
In the land use case In re Killington, Ltd. ,9 the Vermont Supreme Court
again upheld the denial of a land use proposal because of its wildlife ef-
fects. The case involved a pond construction request to create snow at a
skiing area. The Vermont Environmental Board denied the request because
necessary wildlife habitat for black bear would be destroyed or significantly
imperiled. 98 The court affirmed that the "findings are ample to support the
Board's conclusion on necessary wildlife habitat" based on evidence that
the pond would block access to and destroy important wetlands and beech
trees that are a source of food for the bears, that the bears depend on those
food sources, and that there are no other wetlands and food sources avail-
92. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 6086(a)(8)(A). The full text is set forth in App. A.
93. 569 A.2d 501 (Vt. 1989).
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id. at 504.
96. Id.
97. 616 A.2d 241 (Vt. 1992).
98. Id. at 242-43.
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able.99 As in Southview Associates, the court again declined to require
proof of wildlife mortality.'0°
Federal Cases
Agencies protecting wildlife under the Endangered Species Act have a
different statutory burden than local governments in Montana. Nonethe-
less, a comparison to the federal standard is helpful. Critical habitat desig-
nation and biological opinions under the ESA must be based on the "best
scientific and commercial data available,"'' ° commonly referred to as the
"best available science mandate."'
0 2
Using best available science does not require an agency to prepare new
studies if sufficient data exists to make a determination for a particular spe-
cies. The Eighth Circuit in Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service held
"All that is required of the agencies is to seek out and consider all existing
scientific evidence relevant to the decision at hand .... They cannot ignore
existing data."' 103 Heartwood involved a challenge to the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice's decision to log a national forest in Missouri without conducting new
surveys for the endangered Indiana bat. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
had used existing data from mist-netting and surveys in the area before issu-
ing "no jeopardy" opinions. The circuit court upheld this decision on sum-
mary judgment.'°4
In the recent case of Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service10 5 the U.S. District Court in Montana held that the Fish & Wildlife
Service did not need to prepare new studies just because the available scien-
tific and commercial data had flaws. Several advocacy groups sued the
Fish & Wildlife Service and Forest Service, claiming road management
decisions in two grizzly bear ecosystems violated the best available evi-
dence standard. The Fish & Wildlife Service relied on statistical informa-
tion that did not predict the number of grizzlies that could die before the
population failed to recover. However, such predictive data did not exist,
and the court upheld the road decisions, stating that while the data "is not
the best conceivable scientific information upon which to make access
management decisions affecting grizzly habitat. . . . The issue is whether
[the data] is the best available information, and the Plaintiffs have not car-
ried their burden to show that it is not."' 6 It seems that so long as the
99. Id. at 247-48.
100. Id.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2), (b)(I)(A) (2000).
102. For a discussion of the ESA's best available science mandates see Holly Doremus, The Pur-
poses, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 Envtl.
L. 397 (2004).
103. 380 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2004).
104. Id.
105. 465 F.Supp.2d 1067 (D. Mont. 2006).
106. Id. at 1081-1082, 1088 (emphasis in original).
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agency has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connec-
tion between the facts and the decision, that decision will be upheld. 0 7
On the other hand, an agency "cannot ignore available biological infor-
mation . . . which may indicate potential conflicts between the proposed
action and the preservation of endangered species."' 0 8  In Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Kempthorne the Fish & Wildlife Service issued
a biological opinion concluding that the diversion and storage of large vol-
umes of water from the California Bay (Sacramento-San Joaquin) Delta
would not jeopardize the endangered Delta smelt. 109 The agency's opinion
considered several years of Delta smelt trawl surveys, but did not consider
the most recent survey showing record low levels of Delta smelt. In over-
turning the agency's opinion, the federal district court stated that "A bio-
logical opinion is arbitrary and capricious and will be set aside when it has
failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions or when it
has entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem."' ° By
ignoring the latest trawling survey the agency did not consider best avail-
able science and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The district court ob-
served that if the agency did not wish to consider the new survey, it should
have specifically explained in its findings why the new survey did not carry
weight. 1 The Kempthorne decision closely parallels that of Ferry County
(discussed in Section 1), in that the governments in both cases disregarded
certain evidence and relied on inferior evidence in reaching their decisions.
Conclusion
The cases collectively illustrate that a local government need not spend
significant sums to create "definitive," "proven," or "flawless" studies con-
cerning a development's wildlife effects. Madison River R. V. indicates that
evidence "raising serious questions" about wildlife effects is sufficient to
support the government's decision. By the same token, the local govern-
ment cannot speculate, and thus should rely on a combination of opinions
from professionals, information about the affected area, and available stud-
ies and data. In reaching the substantial evidence standard, some best prac-
tices are worth considering:
107. Id. at 1083. "This court 'cannot substitute [its] judgment for that of the Forest Service and Fish
& Wildlife but instead must uphold the agency decisions so long as the agencies have considered the
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'...
The standard does not require the agency to rely on indisputable or unequivocal evidence. The Court
may conclude that '[wihile another decision maker might have reached a contrary result, the agencies
conducted a reasonable evaluation of the relevant information and reached a conclusion that, although
disputable, was not arbitrary and capricious."' (citing Selkirk Conserv. Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d
944 (9th. Cir. 2003)).
108. Natural Resources Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F.Supp.2d 322, 360 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
109. Id. at 324.
110. Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted).
111. /d. at367.
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(1) Use the Phrase "Substantial Evidence." If the findings of a local
government expressly state that there is "substantial evidence" to support a
decision, the local government will be reminded of the evidentiary standard
it must meet and will be more likely to review the record to ensure the stan-
dard is met. As Simmons illustrates, the mere conclusion that a criterion is
met will not be sufficient to support a decision.
(2) Have Substantial Evidence for Every Criterion. In many instances,
a local government will cite multiple reasons for denying or conditioning a
land use proposal. If there truly are multiple reasons, then the government
should look at each reason independently and ensure that each reason is
supported by substantial evidence. Both the Madison River R. V. and Vergin
cases exemplify this approach, which creates multiple reasons for winning
on appeal, even if one individual reason is disregarded by the reviewing
court.
(3) Address Conflicting Evidence. The local government should
squarely address evidence that does not support its decision and explain
why that evidence did not carry weight. To ignore evidence, particularly
uncontroverted evidence, is to violate the substantial evidence rule.
III. THE LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY REQUIRED WHEN USING
FISH & WILDLIFE EVIDENCE
Question Presented
Must scientific evidence include site-specific data, or can a local gov-
ernment rely on outside studies or the general judgments of professional
fish and wildlife biologists?
Short Answer
Although site-specific data is preferable, outside studies or general
judgments of professionals may satisfy the substantial evidence standard if
the studies or judgments are shown to be relevant to the affected area. The
local government should not speculate or presume that an outside study or
the general judgment of a professional applies to the affected area.
General Rules
Depending on the review criteria that apply to a development proposal,
the developer may have a threshold obligation to provide site data to the
local government. If such data is necessary to determine whether the re-
view criteria are met, the local government may require the developer to
provide the data and may deny the development when sufficient data is not
provided.
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For example, in the unpublished decision Quality Rock Products, Inc. v.
Thurston County, a mining company sought a special use permit to expand
a gravel mining operation in Washington.' 2 The mine was adjacent to a
national wildlife refuge and near the Black River. The geology of the area
caused the groundwater under the mine site to flow into the Black River,
which had an impaired water quality classification. The Black River is
"one of the last large, intact riparian systems in the Puget Sound area" and
provides important habitat for migratory birds, fish, and other species.'
3
One of the County's permit criteria required a showing that the proposed
use would not have "substantial or undue adverse effects on . . . [the] natu-
ral environment."'"t 4 Although the mining company did a hydrogeologic
study of the mine operation, it did not study effects on the Black River and
its habitat. The County denied the permit because the company's evidence
did not address the adverse effect on surrounding areas. The reviewing
court upheld the County's decision because the company failed to provide
sufficient evidence that the permit criterion was met." 5 This holding is
consistent with the Simmons case (discussed in Section II), which held that
a developer's environmental assessment did not contain sufficient evidence
about potential effects on water quality in a shallow groundwater area.
In other cases, however, the developer has provided sufficient informa-
tion to review a development proposal, and the local government is faced
with the question of what evidence it needs to deny or conditionally ap-
prove the proposal due to effects on wildlife. No bright line rule exists as to
whether site-specific data is needed in this situation. The facts and com-
plexity of each case, along with the applicable review criteria, will suggest
the specificity of the evidence needed and whether layperson testimony or
professional expertise is necessary. To the extent a general rule exists, it is
that a local government should have enough information in the record that it
is not speculating when it finds that the development proposal will affect
wildlife.
While local government cannot speculate, its lay decision makers can
"rely upon personal knowledge concerning matters readily within their
,,l 16knowledge . .. . Local government may also draw "reasonable infer-
112. 137 Wash. App. 1006, 2007 WL 404720 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2007). The unpublished case of
Unistar Properties v. Town of Putnam provides a second example. There, a local ordinance required a
developer to provide "[t]he types and extent of plant and animal species on the property and the prob-
able effect of the proposed activity on these species." The town denied the developer's application as
incomplete, even though the developer provided expert testimony generally concluding there were no
effects on species, because the developer did not provide a list of the plant and animal species on the
property. The town's denial was upheld as supported by substantial evidence. 2008 WL 344664 *3-5
(Conn. Super. 2008).
113. Quality Rock Products, 2007 WL 404720 at *2.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *8 (applying a "clearly erroneous" standard codified at Rev. Code Wash. §
36.70C. 130(d)).
116. See e.g., United Jewish Ctr. v. Town of Brookfield, 827 A.2d 11, 18 (Conn. App. 2003).
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ences from the factual evidence."'"17 The Christianson v. Gasvoda decision
(discussed in Section H) illustrates these principles, where the lay county
commission members relied on personal investigation of the property's
topography, past flooding history of the property, and community testimony
to draw the reasonable inference that the proposed development would
likely experience drainage and flooding problems.1" 8 Thus, a general wild-
life study or general professional judgment may be adequate if the effects of
the proposed land use are self evident or if reasonable inferences can be
drawn concerning the affected area.
Many wildlife-land use issues, however, will turn on a "technically so-
phisticated and complex question," that is "outside the knowledge and ex-
perience of the lay commission," necessitating that the government obtain
enough site-related evidence to avoid acting arbitrarily and capriciously.' 1 9
As the Ferry County case (discussed in Section II) shows, even a well-
credentialed expert will not carry weight if he relies on general studies and
does not visit the affected area or consult with a local biologist to confirm
the relevance of the studies. Similarly, in Toll Bros., Inc. v. Inland Wet-
lands Commn.,120 a local wetland commission could not rely on general
studies or the general judgment of a soil scientist concluding that excessive
development has an impact on wetlands. In that case, a developer proposed
a 129-unit townhouse complex on property containing wetlands. The
commission relied solely on the general studies and opinions in denying the
development, without showing how the general evidence was relevant to
the specific wetlands at issue. The decision was reversed for lack of sub-
stantial evidence and remanded for additional fact finding. 1 21
The need for technical information also increases when the local gov-
ernment wants to dispute or disregard the expert testimony presented by a
party. The Connecticut appellate opinion Tanner v. Conservation Commis-
sion typifies judicial sentiment on this issue:
[T]he commission, in dealing with complex issues, ignored
the testimony of the expert witnesses and relied solely on
their own insight. While we recognize that an administra-
tive agency is not required to believe any of the witnesses,
including expert witnesses, it must not disregard the only
expert evidence available on the issue when the commis-
sion members lack their own expertise or knowledge. We
find there was no substantial evidence since there was an
117. 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 62:45.
118. Christianson, 242 Mont. at 214-215, 789 P.2d at 1236.
119. See e.g. United Jewish Ctr., 827 A.2d at 18.
120. 922 A.2d 268 (Conn. App. 2007).
121. Id. at 271.
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absolute disregard of the unanimous contrary expert opin-
ion. 122
In Tanner, a landowner in a designated wetland area sought permission
to construct a home and driveway. The City of Norwalk's conservation
commission found, without explanation, that the proposal would adversely
affect the wetland area, despite the landowner's three expert witnesses con-
cluding otherwise. The record contained no evidence supporting the com-
mission's finding, and the reviewing court set aside the commission's deci-
sion for lack of substantial evidence. 23 These facts contrast with those in
Christianson v. Gasvoda, where Cascade County explained why it was dis-
regarding the developer's expert testimony and also cited facts that disputed
the expert's conclusions.
Montana Fish & Wildlife Cases
Madison River R.V. (discussed in Section I) again provides a useful
Montana example. In denying an R.V. park subdivision, the local govern-
ment relied on general studies concerning sewage release from recreational
vehicles. The local government coupled the general sanitation studies with
testimony from a town sanitarian and engineer who identified a serious risk
of the development overloading the town's sewage lagoon and causing vio-
lations of the town's water quality discharge permit. A state fisheries bi-
ologist then provided testimony about how such sewage, if released, would
degrade the water quality and harm the Madison River fishery. Thus, gen-
eral studies and data were made relevant to the affected area through the
testimony of local and state professionals. Although the developer argued
for more definitive data regarding the development's risks, the reviewing
courts found sufficient evidence to uphold denial of the subdivision. 1
24
Fish & Wildlife Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Although not arising in the local government context, the case of Cali-
fornia Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. State Water Resources Control
Board addressed a related question of the quality of site data relied upon by
a decision-making body. 25 In that case, the California Water Resources
Control Board adopted a temperature amendment to the water quality con-
trol plan for Deer Creek in the Sierra Nevada foothills. In setting the new
temperature objective, the Board used a two-step approach that included a
"compilation of scientific literature pertaining to all fish and aquatic species
documented to occur in the creek," and "existing site-specific biological
122. 544 A.2d 258, 258-60 (Conn. App. 1988) (internal citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. 2000 MT 15, H7-8, 32-39, 298 Mont. 91,994 P.2d 1098.
125. 160 Cal. App. 4th 1625, 1633 (2008).
2009]
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
data" that included surveys of aquatic wildlife documented from 1993 to
2000.126 (Such extensive site-specific data would appear necessary to re-
solve the complex question of water temperature control on a creek). The
Board found that the surveys indicated an absence of rainbow trout popula-
tions during summer months, which conflicted with anecdotal evidence
from fishermen that had observed the presence of rainbow trout. Interest
groups questioned the validity and methodology of the surveys, but the re-
viewing court declined to reweigh the evidence, stating that "We are not
entitled to discount evidence 'unless it is physically impossible or inher-
ently improbable and such inherent improbability plainly appears.' . . . We
do not consider the evidence of data compiled from multiple fish surveys
and other studies so implausible or subject to dispute that we may discount
it in this appeal.' 27
As the preceding discussion of Quality Rock Products reveals, the prox-
imity between an impaired habitat and a proposed development can in-
crease the need for site-specific evidence. The case of Minnesota Center
for Environmental Advocacy v. City of St. Paul Park considered the related
question of how to define the "affected area" of a proposed development -
whether the area is limited to the developed property or includes other areas
beyond the development.128 There, the City of St. Paul Park studied the
environmental effects of a proposed 667-acre development partially located
in the Mississippi River Critical Area Corridor and the Mississippi National
River and Recreation Area. The development contained bluffs that were
unusual to Minnesota, as well as bald eagle nests, two endangered and one
threatened species of mussel, and native plants, animals, and birds. An
interest group opposed the City's designation of the study area, which in-
cluded only the proposed development, arguing that the study area failed to
encompass other affected lands and resources.129 The statutes requiring the
study, however, gave the City discretion in designating the study area.' 30
Concluding that the City had substantial evidence to support its designation,
the reviewing court ruled that site-specific evidence outside the study area
could not be used to invalidate the conclusions of the City's environmental
study. 131
Federal Cases
Though Ohio Valley Trail Riders v. Worthington 32 involves the National
Environmental Policy Act, it nonetheless provides a useful discussion con-
126. Id. at 1634-35.
127. Id. at 1639-40.
128. 711 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. App. 2006).
129. Id. at 528-30.
130. Minn. R. § 4410.3610, subp. 1-3.
131. Minn. Cr. for Envtl. Advoc., 711 N.W.2d at 532-34.
132. III F.Supp.2d 878 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
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cerning the use of outside studies to support a government decision. The
case involved the setting of forest management policy in the Daniel Boone
National Forest to deal with off-highway vehicle (OHV) use on trails in the
forest. In determining OH-IV impacts, the U.S. Forest Service consulted
outside studies on erosion and sediment release on roads because many of
the OHV trails were once roadways. The Service also looked at past studies
on OHV use as well as data from other national forests. The Service then
did site visits and interviews within the forest's districts. By "[u]sing the
evidence collected by the Team as well as external studies, the Service con-
cluded that OHV use adversely affected the Forest's resources.' 33 An in-
terest group challenged the Service's methodology, but the reviewing court
concluded that use of outside materials was "reasonable and understand-
able," and that "the agency fulfilled its obligation by looking at appropriate
evidence... .,
1 34
Conclusion
Of all the questions presented in this report, the question about site-
specific evidence is the most difficult to answer because there is no clear
rule. The facts of each case will dictate the level of evidence needed for the
local government to avoid speculation in reaching its decision. To the ex-
tent the cases suggest best practices, they are as follows:
(1) Make the Burden of Proof Clear. If the developer has the initial
burden to provide site-specific data, the government's land use ordinance
should clearly articulate the burden and describe what information is neces-
sary to meet the burden.
(2) Make General Evidence Relevant to the Site. A local government
relying on general studies or professional judgments should couple the gen-
eral evidence with evidence that applies to the affected area. In most cases,
site-specific evidence need not take the form of a definitive, commissioned
study, but could take the form of testimony or observations about the site
that show how the general evidence is relevant.
(3) Consult Experts on Complex Questions. Where the complexity of
the issue is beyond that of a layperson, and the drawing of inferences re-
quires expertise, then a professional should lay the foundation for the gen-
eral evidence and connect that evidence to the affected area.
(4) Expressly Weigh All Evidence. As mentioned previously, the gov-
ernment should explain why it is disregarding certain site-specific evidence,
and it should identify other countervailing evidence in the record to support
its decision. If that countervailing evidence does not exist in the record, the
government may need to consult outside professionals and obtain further
evidence to avoid issuing a decision based on speculation.
133. Id. at 885.
134. Id. at 882-85.
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IV. RESOLVING CONFLICTING FISH & WILDLIFE EVIDENCE
Question Presented
What is a local government's obligation when there is conflicting evi-
dence about fish and wildlife issues?
Short Answer
When conflicting evidence is presented, a local government has the dis-
cretion to weigh the evidence and determine which evidence it finds most
credible. In weighing the evidence, the local government should explain
why it placed more weight on some evidence and less weight on other evi-
dence. The local government's decision will not be overturned if substan-
tial evidence supports the decision.
General Rules
The general rule for conflicting evidence hinges on the substantial evi-
dence standard (discussed in Section I). Because the local government is
the finder of fact, a reviewing court generally does not substitute its judg-
ment, so long as substantial evidence supports the decision. This is true
even if there is conflicting evidence that the court would have weighed dif-
ferently. 135 This deference to the fact finder is in keeping with the defini-
tion of substantial evidence, which requires "more than a mere scintilla of
evidence" but "somewhat less than a preponderance," and which can be
based on "conflicting evidence."
136
In Christianson v. Gasvoda (discussed in Section II), the Montana Su-
preme Court described the County Commissioners as "fact finders . . . in
the best position to weigh conflicting testimony and determine the credibil-
ity of witnesses."'' 37 The County did not give weight to the developer's
expert because he had changed his opinion on the drainage issues, and his
opinion conflicted with other evidence of flooding problems at the devel-
opment site. The County placed greater weight on its own knowledge of
the area and layperson testimony from people living in the area. The
County's resolution of the conflicting testimony was upheld as meeting the
substantial evidence standard.1
38
In Englin v. Board of County Commissioners of Yellowstone County, the
County denied an application to rezone a property from residential to high-
way commercial use. In applying the zoning review criteria, the zoning
commission (which advises the County Commission) first recommended
135. Englin v. Bd. ofCo. Commrs., 2002 MT 115,% 13,310 Mont. I, 48 P.3d 39.
136. Barrett v. Asarco Inc., 245 Mont. 196, 200, 799 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1990).
137. Christianson, 242 Mont. at 215, 789 P.2d at 1236.
138. Id.
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approval and subsequently recommended denial. The zoning commission
made mixed findings of fact, with some findings favoring, and other find-
ings disfavoring, the rezone. While the property was near other commercial
uses, it was also near residential uses and the rezone presented noise and
traffic concerns. The County denied the rezone but adopted the zoning
commission's mixed findings of fact. The landowner argued that the
County acted arbitrarily by denying the rezone while adopting some find-
ings that favored the rezone. The reviewing courts found substantial evi-
dence to support denial of the rezone based on effects to surrounding land-
owners. The Montana Supreme Court observed that a reviewing court "will
not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trier of fact" and will not "sit as
a super-legislature or super-zoning board."'139 Thus, the record can contain
conflicting evidence so long as a substantial amount of evidence supports
the decision.
Montana Fish & Wildlife Cases
Although Montana case law has not set forth a conflicting evidence rule
specific to local government decisions affecting wildlife, a practitioner can
reasonably assume that the rule will extend to wildlife evidence as well.' 
40
Thus, the local government should weigh conflicting wildlife testimony,
explain through findings why it found particular wildlife evidence more
credible, and provide substantial evidence to support its decision.
While not dealing directly with wildlife, Pennaco Energy v. Montana
Board of Environmental Review is instructive. There, the Montana Board
of Environmental Review adopted numeric standards for the water-sodium
adsorption ratio (SAR) and electrical conductivity (EC) of coal bed meth-
ane produced water. Pennaco argued that the Board's standards lacked
"specific findings or [a] sound scientific basis."' 14 1 The standard of review
differs in the case because it involves an agency setting scientific standards
based on its area of expertise. Nonetheless, the district court's discussion of
conflicting evidence reflects deference similar to that given to local gov-
ernment.
The parties in Pennaco Energy stipulated that in general "EC is damag-
ing to plants and SAR is damaging to soils." Beyond this general agree-
ment, the Board received "extensive information and comment from soil
scientists, DEQ technical staff, the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency, industry, environmental groups, and irrigators.' 42 This evidence
139. Englin, ft16-20, 27.
140. Cases such as Madison River R.V. support this assumption. In that case, the County heard
significant evidence supporting and opposing the proposed R.V. park. Although the conflicting evi-
dence rule is not stated in the case, the presence of differing evidence did not affect the County's discre-
tion to deny the development based on substantial evidence.
141. 2007 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 513 (Mont. Dist. Oct. 17, 2007).
142. Id. at*7-8.
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was sometimes in conflict and suggested varying possibilities for how
stringent the numeric standards should be. The district court concluded that
the BER, "in the exercise of its discretion, was entitled to weigh the sci-
ence, compare the veracity of the experts, and make a final determination
based on the evidence presented."'' 43 The court further stated that the law
"does not require the BER to set the standard at the least protective level..
" and that "[t]he fact that data in the administrative record is subject to
scientific debate does not render the agency's conclusions unfounded, nor
should the Court participate in that debate and substitute its judgment for
that of the rulemaking agency."' 44 The reviewing courts upheld the suffi-
ciency of the Board's evidence.
45
Fish & Wildlife Cases from Other Jurisdictions
In Ponderosa Neighborhood Association v. Spokane County, an unpub-
lished opinion, a Washington appellate court upheld the County's approval
of a preliminary plat, despite conflicting evidence over the subdivision's
impact on wildlife. 146 The area provided habitat for elk, deer, and birds,
and neighbors argued that the County had not required the developer to
adequately protect critical habitat and wildlife areas on the property. The
developer's Habitat Management Plan (HMP) provided a 100-foot corridor
to accommodate a seasonal stream and to connect travel corridors and wild-
life habitat. The developer's wildlife biologist prepared the HMP using a
site-specific study evaluating the wildlife and habitat present in the area.
The County's hearing examiner heard conflicting testimony from biologists
and the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife regarding the detrimen-
tal effect the subdivision would have on wildlife. Eight different wildlife
experts and organizations visited the site and found the 100-foot wildlife
corridor inadequate. 1
47
The hearing examiner ultimately found the developer's wildlife biologist
to be credible, found the 100-foot corridor adequate, and concluded that the
proposed subdivision "would not significantly impact priority habitat or
species."'' 48 The appellate court deferred to the hearing examiner because
he was "the local authority with expertise in land use regulation."' 49 The
court further stated that "Under the substantial evidence test, if there is con-
flicting evidence, then the reviewing court need only determine whether the
evidence most favorable to the responding party supports the challenged
143. Id. at *31.
144. Id. at*30-3t.
145. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. ofEnvil. Rev., 2008 MT 425, T 28, 347 Mont. 415, 199 P.3d
191.
146. 141 Wash. App. 1031, 2007 WL 3349121 (Wash. App. Div. 3 2007).
147. Id. at *7-9.
148. Id. at *9.
149. Id. at *.
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decision."'' ° The court thus concluded that substantial evidence supported
the hearing examiner's decision, despite a significant amount of evidence to
the contrary. 151 This ruling reflects the reality that the substantial evidence
standard does not require that a preponderance of the evidence support the
local government's decision.
In re Wildlife Wonderland'5 2 involved a Vermont Environmental Board
decision to deny the construction of a commercial game farm in Mount
Holly, Vermont. The proposed game farm would have housed 300 wild
and domestic animals, with an anticipated 100,000 paying visitors per sea-
son. The game farm would also have involved the construction of a public
building with restaurant facilities, a ticket booth, pathways, a miniature
railroad amusement ride, and parking facilities for approximately 910 cars.
The surrounding area was "essentially forest land and commercially unde-
veloped" and "[t]wo main streams, pristine and essentially free from any
visible or measurable pollutants, run through this parcel and are headwaters
of the West River."'' 53 The Board heard extensive expert testimony from
both proponents and opponents. Although the developer's experts provided
evidence that the game farm would not result in undue water pollution, the
Board found that the fecal matter and bacteria from the animal wastes in the
game farm would "degrade the water quality of the existing streams and
proposed ponds."'
' 54
The Vermont Supreme Court deferred to the Board's findings: "The trier
of fact has the right to believe all of the testimony of any witness, or to be-
lieve it in part and disbelieve it in part, or to reject it altogether.... Thus, it
is not for this Court to reweigh conflicting evidence, reassess the credibility
or weight to be given certain testimony, or determine on its own whether
the factual decision is mistaken."'' 55 The Court found substantial evidence
supported the Environmental Board's decision, and upheld the denial of the
permit for the game farm.1 5
6
Federal Cases
In federal cases, the well-established standard for technical, expert, or
scientific evidence is that when specialists express conflicting views, an
agency has the discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own
qualified experts, even if the court might find contrary views more persua-
150. Id. at *8.
151. Id. at *2, 8-9.
152. 346 A.2d 645 (Vt. 1975).
153. Id. at647.
154. Id. at649.
155. Jd. at 648.
156. Id. at649.
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sive. 157 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the reviewing court will
only set aside agency decisions if they are not supported by substantial evi-
dence 158 or if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law."' 159 This deference to agency decisions
is termed "Chevron deference," named for the court decision establishing
the standard. 16°
Central South Dakota Cooperative Grazing District v. Secretary of U.S.
Department of Agriculture'6' involved a National Environmental Policy Act
challenge over the reduction of grazing levels due, in part, to destruction of
suitable habitat for sharp-tailed grouse. The grazing district argued that
conflicting data concerning grouse nesting rendered the agency's decision
invalid. The Eight Circuit applied Chevron deference, stating "If the ad-
ministrative record contains evidence that supports the positions of both the
agency and the party seeking relief, the agency is entitled to rely on its ex-
perts' tests and observations, and decisions made in such reliance are not
arbitrary and capricious. . . . Even if the agency's data is flawed, if the
agency has relied on a number of findings and only some are erroneous, we
must reverse and remand, only if 'there is a significant chance that but for
the errors the agency might have reached a different result."' 1 62
Conclusion
The cases demonstrate that hearings about land use-wildlife issues will
inevitably include conflicting evidence about effects on wildlife. In consid-
ering conflicting evidence the local government should consider the follow-
ing best practices:
(1) Assess Credibility. If a local government disregards an expert opin-
ion or study, it should explain why it found that witness or study lacking in
credibility. Ignoring expert evidence, without explanation, is a primary
cause for reversal.
(2) Weigh the Evidence. The local government should identify which
evidence among the conflicting evidence has the most weight, and is thus
the most influential in reaching its decision. In particular, when two con-
flicting pieces of evidence are both credible, the government should explain
why one piece of evidence outweighs the other. This explanation becomes
particularly important when the government decision disregards the testi-
157. See generally Home Builders Assn. of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 529 F. Supp.2d
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2007); P. Coast Fedn. of Fishermen's Assns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F. 3d
1082 (9th Cir. 2005); and Natl. Assn. of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (91h Cir. 2003).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
159. Id. at § 706(2)(A).
160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
161. 266 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 899-90.
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mony of what may appear to be a numerical "majority" of expert witnesses
on an issue.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
Wildlife impacts are emerging as an important factor in Montana land
use regulation and decision making. For this reason, Montana case law is
just beginning to address questions about the use of wildlife evidence at the
local government level. By looking to general land use cases in Montana,
as well as trends in other jurisdictions, a practitioner can predict the likely
standards that Montana courts will apply and develop best practices for
local government.
The background cases indicate that a local government should rely on
basic science when adopting ordinances and create a record based on sub-
stantial evidence when making a decision on a specific development pro-
posal. The existence of conflicting evidence is inevitable, and a local gov-
ernment's weighing of that evidence will be upheld as long as its decision
meets the substantial evidence standard. Definitive evidence is not re-
quired, and courts appreciate the heavy costs of developing scientific evi-
dence. Courts thus permit governments to use outside data and studies, but
expect the government to make a connection between the outside data and
the area affected by the government's action. Ultimately, a local govern-
ment should show that it is appropriately exercising its delegated powers by
avoiding speculation and reasonably educating itself about the effects of
land use on wildlife in its community. In this regard, the cases suggest that
state wildlife agencies play a vital role in providing local governments with
the evidence and expertise they need to make legally defensible land use
decisions.
ADDENDUM
After this report was completed, Judge Ed McLean released his opinion
and order in Richards v. Co. of Missoula.163 The Richards decision, pres-
ently on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,164 is one of the few court
decisions in Montana to directly address the issues of wildlife impacts and
land use planning.
In the case, Richards proposed a 119-lot subdivision on 202 acres located
near the Clearwater Junction in Missoula County, Montana. 6  The Mis-
soula County Commission initially denied the application based in part on
its environmental impacts. 166 Richards then reduced the proposal to 59
163. Richards v. Co. of Missoula, Cause No. DV-07-1635 (Mont. Dist. Apr 17, 2009).
164. Richards v. Co. of Missoula, DA 09-0294.
165. Richards, Cause No. DV-07-1635 at 2.
166. Id.
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lots. 167 The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks (FWP) recom-
mended that the County Commission deny this revised subdivision proposal
because of its impacts on wildlife in the area, which was "a major wildlife
movement corridor connecting several wildlife habitat areas of state-wide
importance and . . . a major riparian area critical to the state's trout popula-
tion."'' 68 The proposed subdivision was less than a mile from the Blackfoot-
Clearwater Wildlife Management Area, considered to be a "hub of wildlife
activity."'' 69 FWP also stated that "more wildlife are seasonally connected
within a six-mile radius of the proposed subdivision than any other simi-
larly-sized area in the Blackfoot Watershed or Missoula County."'170 FWP
had documented over 200 wildlife species in the nearby area, including five
threatened or endangered species within a five-mile radius of the proposed
subdivision.
171
As a wildlife mitigation measure, Richards proposed an electric, 8-foot
high wildlife fence surrounding the subdivision to eliminate the wild-
life/human interaction. This fence did not alleviate FWP's concerns be-
cause it would interfere with the natural wildlife migratory corridor.' 72 The
County Commission subsequently denied the 59-lot subdivision, conclud-
ing that Richards would need to reduce the number of lots to 20 and leave
the wildlife habitats and migration corridors undeveloped before his subdi-
vision could be approved. 73 Richards appealed the decision to state district
court.
Consistent with the standard of review discussed in Section II of the re-
port, the district court in Richards reviewed the existing record and applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard outlined in Kiely Construction. 74
Although the court did not use the term "substantial evidence" in the deci-
sion, the court did note that the record contained "sufficient information" to
support the decision.' 75 "The court concluded that the majority of knowl-
edgeable and experienced wildlife experts, as well as members of the pub-
lic, reviewing the complete existing record would be left with the clear and
convincing conclusion the County Commissioners' decision to deny the
proposal is not arbitrary and capricious."' 176 In essence, the court did apply
the substantial evidence standard in determining that the County's decision
was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also carefully reviewed the exist-
ing record and decided that Missoula County had "appropriately considered
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 17-18.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. at 18-19. Threatened or endangered species include: bald eagle, bull trout, Canada lynx,
grizzly bear, and gray wolves.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3-4; Kiely Const., LL.C. v. City of Red Lodge, 2002 MT 241, 312 Mont. 52, 57 P.3d 836.
175. Richards, Cause No. DV-07-1635 at 23.
176. Id. at 30.
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the substantive requirements of the Montana Subdivision and Platting
Act."1
77
Relevant to Section H of the report, the Richards decision addressed the
level of specificity required when relying on fish and wildlife evidence.
Richards claimed that "no scientific data was ever presented" to support the
position that the property was within a critical wildlife movement corridor
or near major wildlife habitats. 178 Richards also maintained that "neither
the State nor the County provided site-specific scientific data to support
their objections. '179 FWP had not conducted actual surveys on the property
in question. However, in the surrounding area "state and county employed
scientists have compiled, developed and studied 'years' of statistical data
regarding wildlife issues," which had all been documented in the record.
1 80
This carefully compiled vicinity data was substantial enough that the
County and State were able to draw inferences from it when concluding that
the Richards' property provided critical wildlife habitat. The court con-
cluded that the County's decision did not require site-specific data because
of this carefully compiled data from the surrounding area181
In addition, the court also declined to review the validity of the underly-
ing science FWP had used. Richards argued summary judgment was pre-
mature because he needed more time to investigate and reveal the "sus-
pected hidden agenda" behind FWP's position.' 82 Because the record was
thorough, the court did not agree with Richards that summary judgment was
premature. As the court explained, "If [Richards] has not been able to find
a 'smoking gun' that FWP has a hidden agenda from his review of the
6,832 pages of documents already produced.., it is very likely that is be-
cause there is no such unlawful conspiracy. ,,183
Relevant to Section IV of the report, the Richards decision also involved
conflicting expert testimony. Richards hired two experts - both Ph.D.s and
ecological consultants - who did their own comprehensive on-site studies
of the property.' 84 Both experts concluded that FWP's positions were not
based on scientific data. 85 Richards' experts testified that the "[Richards']
property is not within a critical wildlife movement corridor or near enough
to any major wildlife habitats which would create a wildlife/human problem
that cannot be mitigated with wildlife fencing rather than reducing the
number of lots to 20."' 186 In opposition to Richards' experts, the court noted
177. Id. at 24.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Id. at 22.
180. Id. at 26.
181. Id. at 30, 35.
182. Id. at 24.
183. Id. at 40.
184. Id. at 22.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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that State and County scientists had compiled and studied "'years' of statis-
tical data regarding wildlife issues in the subject area," which had all been
documented in the record.
87
The court assessed the credibility of the experts on each side and evalu-
ated how Missoula County had weighed the conflicting evidence. The
court noted that Richards' experts were "limited under time-specific con-
straints," while the State and County experts had spent years studying the
wildlife impacts in the area. 88 Because the County Commission had ex-
plained why it found Richards' experts less credible, the court upheld the
decision. In keeping with Christianson v. Gasvoda and other decisions set
out in Section IV, the court in Richards deferred to the County Commis-
sion's first-hand perceptions of which experts provided the most credible
testimony.1
89
APPENDIX A - SELECTED STATUTES FROM OTHER STATES
California
Though the Cortese-Knox Local Government Reorganization Act of
2000 does not specifically address wildlife, it does recognize the impor-
tance of managing growth by charging the local government where the land
is located to create a "sphere of influence" over management of that land.
Additionally, this Act is cross-referenced with Cal. Gov't Code § 50060.5,
which establishes Habitat Maintenance Assessment Districts. This statute
allows a local agency to establish a district, "to provide for the improve-
ment or maintenance of natural habitat."
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires all levels of
government to protect the environment by developing standards and proce-
dures necessary to protect environmental quality. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
21001(g),(h) (2007). To accomplish these goals, the Legislature requires
the local government to consider an environmental impact report (EIR)
before approving a land use development that "may have a significant ef-
fect on the environment." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002.1 (2007);
§ 21151(a) (2003).
Florida
Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Devel-
opment Regulation Act requires local governments to plan and develop
regulations that:
187. Id. at 26.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 26-27.
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12. Assure protection of key natural areas and agricultural
lands that are identified using state and local inventories of
natural areas. Key natural areas include, but are not limited
to:
a. Wildlife corridors.
b. Lands with high native biological diversity, important
areas for threatened and endangered species, species of
special concern, migratory bird habitat, and intact natural
communities.
c. Significant surface waters and springs, aquatic preserves,
wetlands, and outstanding Florida waters.
d. Water resources suitable for preservation of natural sys-
tems and for water resource development.
e. Representative and rare native Florida natural systems.
Fl. Stat. Ann. § 163.3246 (2006). Local governments are subject to state
and regional oversight, but may obtain more local control of certain areas
through a certification process.
Hawaii
Hawaii has enacted priority guidelines for regional growth distribution
and land resource utilization as part of the Hawaii State Planning Act.
These priority guidelines provide aspirational direction for balancing devel-
opment and conservation of land resources, which include wildlife habitat
and endangered species. For an overall look at population growth and land
use guidelines, see Haw. Stat. Ann. §§ 226-104(b)(1) to (13). These statutes
attempt to preserve greenbelts and critical habitats while encouraging
growth in existing urban areas.
For example, Haw. Stat. Ann. § 226-104(10) states that a priority is to
"Identify critical environmental areas in Hawaii to include but not be lim-
ited to the following: watershed and recharge areas; wildlife habitats (on
land and in the ocean); areas with endangered species of plants and wildlife;
natural streams and water bodies; scenic and recreational shoreline re-
sources; open space and natural areas; historic and cultural sites; areas par-
ticularly sensitive to reduction in water and air quality; and scenic re-
sources."
Minnesota
Generally, the Policy section of the Minnesota Critical Areas Act of 1973
does not specifically mention wildlife, but states:
The legislature finds that the development of certain areas
of the state possessing important historic, cultural, or es-
thetic values, or natural systems which perform functions
2009]
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of greater than local significance, could result in irreversi-
ble damage to these resources, decrease their value and
utility for public purposes, or unreasonably endanger life
and property. The legislature therefore determines that the
state should identify these areas of critical concern and as-
sist and cooperate with local units of government in the
preparation of plans and regulations for the wise use of
these areas.
Minn. St. § 116G.02. The Minnesota Rules do mention wildlife impacts
specifically. For instance, the rules on structures in public waters prohibit
certain structures detrimental to significant fish and wildlife habitat:
Minn. R. § 6115.0210, subpart 3: Prohibited placement of
structures. Placement of structures, temporary structures,
and floating structures is prohibited when the structure,
temporary structure, or floating structure:
A. will obstruct navigation or create a water safety hazard;
B. will be detrimental to significant fish and wildlife habi-
tat. Construction is prohibited in posted fish spawning ar-
eas;
C. is designed or intended to be used for human habitation
or as a boat storage structure;
D. is designed or intended to include walls, a roof, or sew-
age facilities; or
E. will take threatened or endangered species listed in
chapter 6134 without authorization by the commissioner
according to parts 6212.1800 to 6212.2300.
Minnesota Environmental Protection Act, Minn. Stat. § 116D.04 also
provides that:
Subd. 6. Prohibitions. No state action significantly affect-
ing the quality of the environment shall be allowed, nor
shall any permit for natural resources management and de-
velopment be granted, where such action or permit has
caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or de-
struction of the air, water, land or other natural resources
located within the state, so long as there is a feasible and
prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable require-
ments of the public health, safety, and welfare and the
state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, wa-
ter, land and other natural resources from pollution, im-
pairment, or destruction. Economic considerations alone
shall not justify such conduct.
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North Carolina
North Carolina's Land Policy Act discusses the need for environmen-
tally-sound land management to preserve and enhance environmental qual-
ity and requires the consideration of natural habitat in present and future
land use planning. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ II 3A- 150 to 11 3A- 159.
Oregon
The Oregon Land Use Planning Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.230, requires
that when adopting or amending goals for development, the responsible
agency will consider, "(B) Estuarine areas; (C) Tide, marsh and wetland
areas; (D) Lakes and lakeshore areas; (E) Wilderness, recreational and out-
standing scenic areas; (F) Beaches, dunes, coastal headlands and related
areas; (G) Wild and scenic rivers and related lands; (H) Floodplains and
areas of geologic hazard; (I) Unique wildlife habitats" Additionally, certain
land with significant wildlife habitat can be designated with a wildlife habi-
tat special assessment by the State Fish and Wildlife Commission. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 308A.415.
Rhode Island
The Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 45-22.2-1 to 4, acknowledges that land, water and air are finite and
comprehensive planning must provide for the protection of these resources.
The goals of the Act include:
(4) To promote the protection of the natural, historic and
cultural resources of each municipality and the state.
(5) To promote the preservation of the open space and rec-
reational resources of each municipality and the state.
(6) To provide for the use of performance-based standards
for development and to encourage the use of innovative
development regulations and techniques that promote the
development of land suitable for development while pro-
tecting our natural, cultural, historical, and recreational re-
sources, and achieving a balanced pattern of land uses.
Vermont
Vermont's Land Use and Development Act ("Act 250") is unique in pro-
viding that a permit for development shall be denied if the proposed devel-
opment or subdivision would destroy or significantly imperil necessary
wildlife habitat or any endangered species.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 6086(a):
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(8) Will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or
natural beauty of the area, aesthetics, historic sites or rare
and irreplaceable natural areas.
(A) Necessary wildlife habitat and endangered species. A
permit will not be granted if it is demonstrated by any party
opposing the applicant that a development or subdivision
will destroy or significantly imperil necessary wildlife
habitat or any endangered species; and
(i) the economic, social, cultural, recreational, or other
benefit to the public from the development or subdivision
will not outweigh the economic, environmental, or recrea-
tional loss to the public from the destruction or imperilment
of the habitat or species; or
(ii) all feasible and reasonable means of preventing or less-
ening the destruction, diminution, or imperilment of the
habitat or species have not been or will not continue to be
applied; or
(iii) a reasonably acceptable alternative site is owned or
controlled by the applicant which would allow the devel-
opment or subdivision to fulfill its intended purpose.
Washington
The Washington Growth Management Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§
36.70A.010 et seq., requires designation of critical habitat and open space
corridors in the comprehensive plans of a county with a population exceed-
ing 50,000 or a 17% population increase over 10 years (10% increase if 10
year period was before 1995). Wash. St. § 36.70A.040.
This Act also provides goals for local counties and cities required or opt-
ing to create comprehensive land use plans and development regulations.
These goals include the preservation of fish and wildlife habitat as part of
open space.
Wash. St. § 36.70A.020(9). "Open space and recreation. Retain open
space, enhance recreational opportunities, conserve fish and wildlife habi-
tat, increase access to natural resource lands and water, and develop parks
and recreation facilities."
The required designation of critical areas includes fish and wildlife habi-
tat. Wash. St. § 36.70A.030(5). "Critical areas" include the following areas
and ecosystems: (a) Wetlands; (b) areas with a critical recharging effect on
aquifers used for potable water; (c) fish and wildlife habitat conservation
areas; (d) frequently flooded areas; and (e) geologically hazardous areas.
In addition, the required identification of open space corridors includes
wildlife habitat. Wash. St. § 36.70A.160. "Each county and city that is re-
quired or chooses to prepare a comprehensive land use plan under RCW
36.70A.040 shall identify open space corridors within and between urban
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growth areas. They shall include lands useful for recreation, wildlife habitat,
trails, and connection of critical areas as defined in RCW 36.70A.030...."
Best available science is to be used by counties and cities in designating
and protecting critical areas when developing policies and development
regulations. Additionally, when a petition involves a critical area, the
growth management hearings board can have a scientist or other expert
review the petition if they feel assistance would be necessary or helpful in
reaching a conclusion. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.172 (1995). The criteria
for best available science are defined within the Growth Management Act
at Wash. Admin. Code 365-195-900 through -925 (2008).
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